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ARTICLES

Business Associations
by Paul A. Quir6s*
and
Gregory M. Beil**
This Article analyzes noteworthy cases in the areas of corporate,
partnership, securities and banking law decided during the survey

period' by the Georgia Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court,
the United States district courts in Georgia and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Additionally, the Article highlights
certain enactments by the Georgia General Assembly revising the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.").

* Partner in the firm of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia.
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1. The survey period is June 1, 1994 through May 31, 1995.
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CORPORATIONS

A.

Piercingthe Corporate Veil
The concept of piercing the corporate veil to hold shareholders
personally liable for the debts of the corporation has been used by the
Georgia courts in an attempt to remedy fraud or injustice. The courts,
however, have failed to define precise standards to apply to rather
predictable factual scenarios. Consequently, the results often seem
contradictory and confused.2
Georgia courts generally frame the issue as whether the corporation
is the alter ego or business conduit of its owner.' The principal inquiry
is not the composition of corporate ownership or control since, under
Georgia law, a corporation and its shareholders or officers are distinct
entities even if wholly-owned and controlled by an individual.4
To establish a claim to pierce a corporate veil the plaintiff must show:
(1) that the shareholder's disregard of the corporate entity made it a
mere instrumentality for the transaction of its own affairs; (2) that there
is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personality of
the corporation and the owner or officer no longer exists; and (3) that to
adhere to the doctrine of a separate corporate entity would promote
injustice or protect fraud.5 For the issue to be submitted to a jury,
Georgia courts require evidence that the corporate arrangement is a
sham used to defeat justice, to perpetuate
fraud, or to evade statutory,
6
contractual or tort responsibility.
Every year there are a number of reported cases in which a claimant
seeks to pierce the corporate veil to reach the assets of a corporation's
shareholders. The inquiry is a jury question and often these claims are
tried in the course of litigation, although they may not be the main claim
in a case. This activity will continue and be encouraged so long as the

2. See Paul A. Quir6s & Donna Ruth Jones, Business Associations, 40 MERCER L. REV.
61, 68 (1988).
3. See, e.g., J & J Materials, Inc. v. Conyers Seafood Co., 214 Ga. App. 63, 64, 446
S.E.2d 781, 782-83 (1994); Hickman v. Hyzer, 261 Ga. 38, 401 S.E.2d 738 (1991);
Darbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, 194 Ga. App. 840, 392 S.E.2d 37 (1990); Amason
v. Whitehead, 186 Ga. App. 320, 367 S.E.2d 107 (1988).
4. International Telecommunications Exch. Corp. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,
892 F. Supp. 1520, 1551-52 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (citing United States v. Fidelity Capital Corp.,
920 F.2d 827, 837 (11th Cir. 1991) and Byrd v. Brand, 140 Ga. App. 135, 136, 230 S.E.2d
113 (1976)).
5. See cases cited supra note 3.
6. Id.
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legislature and the courts do not develop a more workable set of legal
standards to apply to veil-piercing claims.
(i) The Judiciary Seeks to Apply the Standard. In Mitcham v.
Blalock,' the court of appeals was asked to reverse a trial court which
refused to pierce the corporate veil in a suit brought by an investor
against the officers and directors of an investment company for losses
allegedly caused by the corporation's broker's fraudulent acts and by the
corporation's officers' and directors' negligent supervision, control and
management.' Once pierced, the plaintiff sought to recover against the
corporation's officers and directors under section 14(c) of the Georgia
Securities Act of 1973' and under common law doctrines of respondeat
superior and breach of fiduciary duty.'0
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in
favor of the defendants and the attendant decision to insulate the
corporation's officers and directors from personal liability." Although
the Court noted the plaintiff's claim under the Georgia Securities Act
was time barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitation, 12 it
did analyze the veil-piercing claim and decided the plaintiff had failed
to clear the essential hurdle to litigating the veil-piercing issue-that
"some persuasive reason" for doing so must be presented."3
The plaintiff presented affidavits from two experts in the field of
securities management supporting his claims that the defendants'
management of the corporation was far below industry standards, but
the court found the evidence insufficient to litigate the issue, stating
that "plaintiff presented no evidence that defendants disregarded
separation of the corporate entity by commingling assets or abuses of
corporate form."" Further, the court placed no weight on the fact that
the plaintiff had previously secured a $60,000 arbitration award against
the corporation and its broker.'5 Instead, the court grounded its
decision in the level of officer and director misconduct needed to pierce
the corporate veil, explaining:

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

214 Ga. App. 29, 447 S.E.2d 83 (1994).
Id. at 34, 447 S.E.2d at 88.
O.C.G.A. § 10-5-14(c) (1994).
214 Ga. App. at 29-30, 447 S.E.2d at 85.
Id. at 35, 447 S.E.2d at 89.
See id. at 31, 447 S.E.2d at 85-86; see also O.C.G.A. § 10-5-14(d) (1994).
214 Ga. App. at 34, 447 S.E.2d at 88. See supra text accompanying note 6.
Id., 447 S.E.2d at 88.
Id. at 35, 447 S.E.2d at 89.
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An officer of a corporation who takes part in the commission of a tort
by the corporation is personally liable therefore, but an officer of a
corporation who takes no part in the commission of a tort committed
by the corporation is not personally liable unless he specifically
directed the particular act to be done or participated or co-operated

therein. 16
The plaintiff failed to make the required showing of improper corporate
purpose or tortious misconduct. In fact, the officers and directors had no
personal contact with the plaintiff. Thus, the court readily declined to
pierce the veil. 7
A more difficult question of whether to pierce the corporate veil or,
more particularly, whether to submit the question to a jury was
presented in J & J Materials, Inc. v. Conyers Seafood Co.'" Here, the
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of a directed
verdict in favor of a judgment debtor and its principal on a finding of no
fraud, but reversed the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the
debtor's principal involving an alter ego claim on evidentiary grounds. 9
Appellant, J & J Materials ("J & J") had filed an action on account to
recover payment from appellee, Conyers Seafood Company ("CSC"), for
seafood CSC had procured from J & J in 1988.20 The trial court
subsequently awarded J & J a default judgment exceeding $27,000.21
J & J could not collect on its judgment and brought an action below
against CSC, CSC's sole shareholder, L.W. Evans, and Mrs. Evans for
fraud and deceit." The complaint alleged the default judgment had not
been satisfied, and that in his responses to post-judgment interrogatories, Mr. Evans made fraudulent misrepresentations on behalf of CSC
as to the nature and extent of CSC's assets in order to deceive J & J into
believing the default judgment was uncollectible."
Another claim tried to hold Mr. Evans personally liable as CSC's
principal for the default judgment debt by piercing CSC's corporate
veil.24 The defendants denied the allegations of the complaint and

16. Id., 447 S.E.2d at 88 (quoting Lincoln Land Co. v. Palfery, 130 Ga. App. 407, 411,
203 S.E.2d 597 (1973), quoting Smith v. Hawks, 182 Ga. App. 379,384,385,355 S.E.2d 669
(1987)).
17. Id.
18. 214 Ga. App. 63, 446 S.E.2d 781 (1994) (McMurray, P.J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 65, 446 S.E.2d at 783.
20. Id. at 63, 446 S.E.2d at 782.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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argued that J & J failed to recover the default judgment because it did
not exercise due diligence in enforcing the judgment.2 5
The facts before the court on which to evaluate the lower court's
verdict were clear. Mr. Evans established a seafood wholesale business
and restaurant in Georgia in 1973.6 The enterprise was initially a sole
27
proprietorship and operated under the tradename "Conyers Seafood."
In 1981, Evans incorporated his wholly-owned business and added "Inc."
to the name "Conyers Seafood Company," but the business was always
known simply as "Conyers Seafood."' In June 1987, Evans sold the
retail side of Conyers Seafood to Captain Don's Seafood, Inc., which
concomitantly leased-back space to Evans. 9 The sale did not involve
any transfer of goodwill, tradename, telephone numbers, and the like.3"
Evans still owned the wholesale side of Conyers Seafood, but planned to
wind it down. 3 After Captain Don's defaulted on the promissory note
it gave Evans to finance the purchase, Evans brought an action in
October 1987 on behalf of himself and CSC against Captain Don's and
its principal seeking to repossess the premises.32
In January 1988, J & J filed suit against CSC to recover payment for
the seafood it had shipped to CSC in April 1987. 33 J & J received its
default judgment in August 1988."4 In October 1988, Evans repossessed the premises from Captain Don's but failed to recover for amounts
owed Evans on the note.35 In November 1988, Evans and his wife
formed L & M Evans, Inc. d/b/a Conyers Seafood.36 Mrs. Evans owned
all of the shares of the corporation.37 Conyers Seafood operated in its
usual fashion, although corporate accounts were established to reflect
the change in ownership.3" These facts were reflected in Mr. Evans'
responses to J & J's post-judgment interrogatories.39
On appeal J & J argued that Mr. Evans' responses to the postjudgment interrogatories stated that CSC was no longer in business and
25. Id.
26. Id. at 66, 446 S.E.2d at 783.

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id., 446 S.E.2d at 783-84.
Id., 446 S.E.2d at 784.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that CSC was not owed money by any person or entity.4 ° The focus of
J & J's argument was that it reasonably believed CSC was no longer in
business after the $27,000 judgment was rendered.41 But the trial
court found J & J's sole shareholder had knowledge that the business
was operating under the tradename "Conyers Seafood" and that Mr.
Evans' response was not deceptive since CSC was no longer in existence.42 The court of appeals therefore readily affirmed the lower
court's finding of no fraud. 4' The court refused, however, to affirm the
trial court's directed verdict in favor of CSC and Evans with respect to
the veil-piercing claim.44
The court commented that J & J's contention that it should be allowed
to pierce the corporate veil of CSC and pursue satisfaction of its
judgment against Mr. Evans in his personal capacity as CSC's sole
shareholder was a "different matter" than the fraud claim against
him.45 Couching its distinction in the "any evidence test"-the standard used to grant or deny a directed verdict-the court stated:
In Georgia, the standard used to review the grant or denial of a
directed verdict is the any evidence test. Where there is no conflict in
the evidence as to any material issue, and the evidence introduced,
with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular
verdict, such verdict shall be directed."
The court then framed the issue in the traditional manner as whether
the corporation served as the alter ego of its sole shareholder.4 7 After
explaining the plaintiff's hurdle to submitting the question of whether
to pierce CSC's corporate veil to the jury and the standard the jury must
apply in its decision, the court listed the evidence which supported its
reversal of the lower court's decision not to pierce.4"
J & J Materials, the court found, presented sufficient evidence for a
jury to conclude that CSC was a mere business conduit for its sole
shareholder, Mr. Evans.49 Additional facts which the court found
warranted submission of the piercing issue to a jury included: CSC only

40. Id. at 67, 446 S.E.2d at 784.
41. Id., 446 S.E.2d at 784-85.
42.

43.
44.
45.
46.
S.E.2d
47.
48.

Id.

Id. at 64, 446 S.E.2d at 782.
Id. at 65, 446 S.E.2d at 783.
Id. at 64, 446 S.E.2d at 782.
Id. (citing Hixson-Hopkins Autoplex v. Custom Coaches, 208 Ga. App. 820(1), 432
224 (1993)).
Id.
Id. at 65, 446 S.E.2d at 783.

49. Id.
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received a tradename from Evans when formed; CSC paid Evans for its
operations furniture, but the furniture was personally owned by Evans;
Evans personally sold the retail end of CSC, which was supposedly
owned by CSC, not Evans; and L & M Evans, Inc. was realizing the
benefits of the Conyers Seafood tradename and goodwill even though it
never paid CSC for those intangibles when it succeeded CSC as operator
of Conyers Seafood. 0
While the court found evidence of fraudulent transfers important in
submitting the question to a jury, it nonetheless granted a directed
verdict in the Appellees' favor with respect to the claim for fraud.
Presumably, the court believed the veil-piercing issue was properly a
matter for jury consideration on grounds that the corporate arrangement
was a sham, used to defeat injustice, or used to evade statutory,
contractual or tort responsibility, but not because fraud may have been
committed by the Appellees. The problem, however, lies in drawing a
line of distinction between the various forms of misconduct.
Judge McMurray dissented from the court's decision to reverse the
trial court's directed verdict in favor of CSC and Mr. Evans on J & J's
claim to pierce the corporate veil."' The Judge agreed there was no
fraud involved in any of the transactions surrounding the formation,
operation, and transfer of ownership of CSC to L & M Evans, Inc.52
Judge McMurray argued that "... [a properly formed] corporation is
prima facie a distinct legal entity with rights and liabilities which are
separate from those of [its shareholders] . . . ."" The Judge recognized

that the agreements relating to the sale to Captain Don's were between
Captain Dons, Inc. and L.W. Evans in his individual capacity.54 CSC
was not a party to the agreements and, consistent with Mr. Evans'
responses to post-judgment interrogatories, CSC was owed no money."5
Moreover, the dissent explained that the facts that L & M Evans, Inc.
kept the same phone number and used the same tradename that CSC
had used previously did not destroy Mr. Evans' prima facie status as
insulated from liability for the debts of CSC. s"
Thus, like the majority, Judge McMurray found no basis for the claims
of fraud and deceit. However, unlike the majority, he found the evidence

50. Id.
51. Id. at 65, 446 S.E.2d at 783 (McMurray, P.J., dissenting).

52. Id.
53. Id. at 67, 446 S.E.2d at 784 (quoting Midtown Properties, Inc. v. George F.
Richardson, 139 Ga. App. 182, 185, 228 S.E.2d 303 (1976) and citing Jones v. Adamson's,
Inc., 147 Ga. App. 282, 283-84, 248 S.E.2d 514 (1978)).
54. Id.
55. Id., 446 S.E.2d at 784-85,
56. Id. at 67-68, 446 S.E.2d at 785.
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did not provide a basis for submitting the question of whether to pierce
the corporate veil to the jury, stating: "'[Olne who deals with a
corporation as such an entity cannot, in the absence of fraud, deny the
legality 57of the corporate existence for the purpose of holding the owner
liable."'
The dissent argued that the facts which the majority believed would
authorize a jury to pierce CSC's corporate veil to hold Mr. Evans
personally liable for the default judgment were not sufficiently compelling to warrant reversal of the trial court's directed verdict.58 In Judge
McMurray's opinion, there was no evidence of fraud or injustice, or an
attempt to avoid statutory, contractual or tort responsibilities.59 He
warned that the majority's holding "comes perilously close to permitting
the sole shareholder of a close corporation to be personally liable for the
debts of his corporation simply because he is the sole shareholder."6
Judge McMurray continued:
"[Alithough grossly inadequate capitalization and preferential
payments may, under some circumstances, rise to a level of abuse of
the corporate form, the undisputed facts of this case demonstrate no
abuse of the corporate form sufficient to justify piercing the corporate
veil. There is no evidence that [Evans] seized assets in order to strip
the [clorporation of assets necessary to pay existing debts. There is
nothing in the record to indicate fraudulent intent."61
The dissent demonstrates the judicial tension in developing a workable
standard for differentiating fraud from other misconduct, and misconduct from legitimate asset protection planning. Applying the often
enunciated piercing standards, the majority and the dissent came to
opposite conclusions on the same facts. This is always disturbing, but
especially so when a clear and important policy which the Georgia law
seeks to promote is the encouragement of equity investment in business
without the fear of unlimited liability.
(ii) Creditor of Foreign Debtor-Corporation Precluded by the
Interaction of Georgia Law, the Law of, the Foreign State of
Incorporation and the Bankruptcy Code from Maintaining a VeilPiercing Claim. In Realmark Investment Co. u. American Financial

57. Id. at 68, 446 S.E.2d at 785 (quoting Lamas v. Baldwin, 140 Ga. App. 37, 40, 230

S.E.2d 13 (1976) and citing Williams Plaza v. Sedgefield Sportswear Div. of Bell Blue, Inc.,
164 Ga. App. 720, 723, 297 S.E.2d 342 (1982)) (punctuation omitted).
58, Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting Hickman v. Hyzer, 261 Ga. 38, 40(2), 401 S.E.2d 738 (1991)).
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Corp.,62 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia had to decide how the Georgia Supreme Court would apply
conflict of laws rules to determine whether a claim to pierce the
corporate veil was property of the bankruptcy estate or, on the other
hand, whether the claim was property of the bankrupt-debtor, thus
giving creditors standing to bring a claim to pierce the corporate veil.6
The plaintiff, Realmark Investment Co. ("Realmark"), a Georgia
corporation, purchased subordinated debentures, due October 15, 1997,
issued by Circle K Corporation ("Circle IV)." In May 1990, Circle K,
a Texas corporation, and its affiliates filed petitions for reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 5 in the United States
District Court for the District of Arizona.6 Realmark brought suit
against American Financial Corporation ("AFC"), an Ohio corporation,
seeking to pierce the veil between AFC and Circle K on grounds that
AFC was merely the alter ego of Circle K and, as such, should answer
for the debts of Circle K. AFC moved- to dismiss Realmark's complaint.67
The district court first provided the analytical framework for its
decision on whether to grant or deny AFC's motion to dismiss. The court
commented that as a federal district court faced with a diversity case,
its first inquiry was the conflict of law rules of the forum state, Georgia,
to determine which state's law governs a claim to pierce the veil of a
debtor-corporation which is brought by a creditor outside the bankruptcy
court.68 Then, if Georgia's law allowed Circle K, as debtor-corporation,
to assert a claim to pierce its own corporate veil to reach its controlling
shareholder prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the claim was
property of the estate under Bankruptcy Code section 541(a).69 If the
claim was property of the estate, then only the bankruptcy trustee or the
debtor-in-possession, as the case may be, could assert the veil-piercing
claim; in which case creditors, such as the plaintiff, Realmark, would
have no standing to assert such a claim. 0 If the claim was property of
the estate, then the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
would stay an action seeking to pierce the corporate veil.7 '

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

171 B.R. 692 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994).
Id. at 694.
Id. at 693.
11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1994) (Chapter 11).
171 B.R. at 693.
Id.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 695.

70. Id.
71. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362 (the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision).
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The court recognized that Georgia courts have not directly addressed
the issue of which state's laws apply in veil-piercing claims in diversity
cases.7 2 Consequently, this conflict of laws issue had to be resolved by
the federal district court as it believed the Georgia Supreme Court would
have decided it.7
The defendant, AFC, maintained the Georgia Supreme Court would
apply the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws' view, which calls for
application of the law of the state of incorporation to determine a
shareholder's liability to the corporation or to a corporation's creditors
for corporate debts.74 AFC argued that, because Circle K is incorporated in Texas, Texas law applied to questions of piercing the corporate
veil.75
AFC's argument was simple and effective. It proffered that since the
Georgia Supreme Court had followed the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws in the corporations context before, the Court would
again follow the Restatement approach in the case at bar.76
The district court cited Diedrich u. Miller & Meier & Associates,
Architects & Planners,Inc., " a case in which the court held that a suit
against the officers and directors of a foreign corporation for misappropriation of a corporate opportunity was an internal affair properly
regulated by the law of the foreign corporation's state of incorporation
and not by Georgia law.7" The court based its decision on Georgia
Business Corporation Code section 14-2-310, which provides that
"nothing contained in the [Business Corporations chapter] shall be
construed to authorize [Georgia] to regulate the internal affairs of a
[foreign] corporation."79 Further, the Diedrich court's decision was a
recognition of the internal affairs doctrine as pronounced by the
Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws-that the doctrine applies
"whenever the issue concerns the relations inter se of the corporation, its
shareholders, directors, officers or agents. ....
80
In holding that Texas law applied to issues of piercing the corporate
veil, the district court mentioned the plaintiff offered no cases to dispute
the extension of the internal affairs doctrine as pronounced by the

72. 171 B.R. at 694.

73. Id.
74. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 307 (1971)).

75. Id. at 694.

76. Id.
77. 254 Ga. 734, 334 SE.2d 308 (1985).
78. Id. at 735, 334 S.E.2d at 310.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
(1971)).

CONFLICT OF

LAWS §§ 309 and 313 cmt. a
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Restatement to alter ego claims.81 Consequently, until the Georgia
Supreme Court directly addresses the issue, the internal affairs doctrine
as described in the Restatement applies to claims in which the plaintiff
seeks to pierce the veil of a foreign corporation, at least in the context
of claims based on alter ego grounds.
The Restatement's pronouncement of the internal affairs doctrine was
also applied by the court in determining whether Georgia law would
have allowed Circle K, as debtor-corporation, to assert a claim to pierce
its own corporate veil to reach its controlling shareholder prior to the
filing of a bankruptcy petition. 2 If so, then the claim would have been
property of the estate under Bankruptcy Code section 541(a) and the
creditor-plaintiff, Realmark, would not have had standing to assert its
claim for relief. Under the doctrine, the law of the state of incorporation
applied. s' Texas law permits a corporation to pierce its own veil."'
Accordingly, since the debtor, Circle K, could have brought its own alter
ego claim, the claim to pierce the corporate veil was property of the
bankruptcy estate.' Therefore, only the bankruptcy trustee (or debtor
in possession) had standing to assert the alter ego claim to recover
property of the bankruptcy estate.' The creditor-plaintiff, Realmark,
had no standing to assert its veil-piercing claim because of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision."'
(iii) Reverse Use of Alter Ego Doctrine Rejected. In a couple of
cases, plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to reverse the use of the alter
ego doctrine to hold a corporation liable for the debts of an individual.
In Gwinnett Property,N.Y v. G + H Montage GmbH,'8 a West German
construction company, G + H, contracted to build a storage facility in
Iran for an Iranian corporation. 9 Rahim Irvani personally guaranteed
payment under the contract to G + H.'° The Iranian corporation
defaulted on the contract and G + H later obtained a judgment in
England against Irvani on his guarantee.9 G + H subsequently filed
an action in a Georgia superior court asking the court to recognize the

81. 171 B.R. at 695.
82. Id.

83. Id.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 695-96.
Id. at 696.
215 Ga. App. 889, 453 S.E.2d 52 (1994).
Id. at 899, 453 S.E.2d at 53.
Id., 453 S.E.2d at 53-54.
Id., 453 S.E.2d at 54.
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judgment against Irvani and alleging fraudulent conversion of assets by
Irvani to several corporations.9 2 The trial court entered judgment for
G + H, but the Georgia Supreme Court reversed.9 3
At the second trial, G + H tried to have the foreign judgment
recognized and claimed that eight corporations were liable for Irvani's
personal debts not only on alter ego grounds, but also for receiving the
With respect to the
fraudulently conveyed assets from Irvani.94
fraudulent conveyance claim, the jury returned a verdict for over $8
million in favor of G + H and against Irvani and seven of the corporations.95 The jury also found one of the companies, Granite Industrial
Development & Services Corporation ("GIDS"), liable as Irvani's alter
ego.96 Judgment was entered on the jury verdict and the seven
corporate defendants appealed the judgment and the court's denial of
their motion for judgment n.o.v.97 Irvani appealed separately.9"
On appeal, the court reversed the trial court with respect to the alter
ego claim.99 The first reason for reversal was that Irvani was not a
GIDS shareholder.' 0 The court found the alter ego doctrine inapplicable where a shareholder is not involved, stating:
"To establish the alter ego doctrine it must be shown that the
stockholders' disregard of the corporate entity made it a mere
instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs; that there is
such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of
the corporation and the owners no longer exist; and to adhere to the
doctrine of corporate entity would promote injustice or protect
fraud."'1
Further, the court found that G + H improperly reversed the use of the
alter ego and corporate veil-piercing doctrines. The court noted the alter
ego doctrine is generally used to pierce the corporate veil to hold an
individual shareholder personally liable for the debts of the corpora-

92. Id.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 895, 453 S.E.2d at 57.
Id. at 894, 453 S.E.2d at 57.
Id. at 892,453 S.E.2d at 56 (quoting Farmers Warehouse of Pelham v. Collins, 220

Ga. 141, 150(2Xd), 137 S.E.2d 619 (1964) and Marett v. Professional Ins. Careers, 201 Ga.
App. 178, 180(1)(b), 410 S.E.2d 373 (1991)).
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tion. °2 In the court's view, the evidence supporting G + H's assertion
of its veil-piercing claim was inseparable from that supporting its
fraudulent conveyance claim." 3 However, the court of appeals reversed the lower court's judgment as to G + H's fraudulent conveyance
claim."
Consequently, the court found that G + H's reliance on the
same evidence revealed that it had not asserted a proper alter ego claim,
but rather had improperly asserted a fraudulent conveyance claim under
the guise of a veil-piercing claim.0 5
Similarly, in InternationalTelecommunications Exchange Corp. v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp., °6 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia refused to reverse the use of the veilpiercing doctrine to reach a corporation to recover on the personal
guarantee of its guarantor." 7 The court found a claim for fraud on the
part of the guarantor could not be imputed to the corporation and,
therefore, the claim to pierce the corporate veil was improper. 10'
(iv) Court Rejects Plaintiffs Use of Alter Ego Doctrine to
Secure Personal Jurisdiction. Another example of the improper use
of the alter ego doctrine can be found in Taeger Enterprises, Inc. v.
Herdlein Technologies, Inc., 9 a case in which the plaintiff made an
unsuccessful alter ego claim in an effort to secure personal jurisdiction
over a defendant. In Taeger Enterprises a subcontractor brought an
action for fraudulent inducement and conversion against two nonresidents-a corporate contractor's president, Oehler, and a separate
corporate consultant, Herdlein Technologies, Inc. ("HTI")." ° Neither
defendant had significant ties to Georgia such that they would be subject
to the court's personal jurisdiction."'
Nonetheless, the plaintiff attempted to impute the activities of the
corporate contractor to HTI such that the aggregate contacts of both the
corporate contractor and HTI taken together would be sufficient for the
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants."2 The

102. Id. at 893, 453 S.E.2d at 57 (citing Southern Envtl. Group v. Rosebud Landscape
Gardeners, 196 Ga. App. 392, 394(1), 395 S.E2d 913 (1990)).
103. Id.
104. Id.

105. Id.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110,
111.

892 F. Supp. 1520 (N.D, Ga. 1995)
Id. at 1552.
Id. at 1551-52.
213 Ga. App, 740, 445 S.E.2d 848 (1994).
Id. at 740, 445 S.E.2d at 850-51.
Id. at 747, 445 S.E.2d at 855.

112, Id.
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basis of the plaintiffs argument was that it did not know the corporate
contractor and HTI were separate entities, as they worked closely
together and shared office space, secretarial services, and telephone
numbers.'" The court found the subcontractor's ignorance of the fact
that the HTI had an existence separate from the corporate contractor
was not competent evidence that HTI was an alter ego of the corporate
contractor such that the actions of the contractor in Georgia
could be
114
attributed to HTI to secure personal jurisdiction over HTI.
B. Liabilityfor PreincorporationTransactions--StatuteSupplants
Common Law "PromoterLiability"
In Weir v. Kirby Construction Co., 15' the Georgia Court of Appeals
clearly explained there is no common law theory of "promoter liability."
Instead, Georgia Business Corporation Code section 14-2-204 is the
exclusive statement of the law on liability for preincorporation transactions. Under section 14-2-204, all persons purporting to act as or on
behalf of a corporation with actual knowledge there was no incorporation
are jointly and severally liable for all liabilities created while so
acting. 116
In Weir, the defendant, Paul Weir, contracted as president of a
corporation with the plaintiff, Kirby Construction Company ("Kirby"), for
renovations work."' After the work was completed, Kirby billed
Weir's corporation for $431,000.18 Weir's corporation only paid
'
$394,191. 19
Kirby sued Weir for the difference after discovering that
when Weir entered the contract as president of the corporation, its
certificate of incorporation had not been issued.' 20 There was no
evidence, however, that Weir actually knew the certificate of incorporation had not yet been issued when he executed the contract on behalf of
the corporation.'
Kirby sued Weir in the trial court under a theory of common law
"promoter liability" as presented in Wells v. Fay & Egan Co. 122 Weir

113. Id. at 746, 445 S.E.2d at 854.
114. Id. at 746-47, 445 S.E.2d at 854-55.
115. 213 Ga. App. 832,446 S.E.2d 186 (1994). This case was decided one month before
the beginning of the survey period, but was reconsidered during the survey period.
116. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-204 (1994).
117. 213 Ga. App. at 832, 446 S.E.2d at 186.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 833, 446 S.E.2d at 186.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing 143 Ga. 732, 85 S.E. 873 (1915) which states the common law theory
of "promoter liability" as:
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moved for summary judgment on grounds that Georgia Business
Corporation Code section 14-2-204 effectively supplanted the common
law theory of "promoter liability" and former Business Corporation Code
section 14-2-23.123 Weir's motion for summary judgment was denied
and the court charged the jury: "'If Paul J. Weir, at the time of the
signing of the contract ...

knew or should have known that [his

corporation] was not incorporated then he is personally liable to [Kirby]
for any sums remaining due on the contract. '"" 4 The jury returned a
verdict against Weir for $36,493.06 and awarded $22,330.60 in attorney's
fees, while the court assessed interest in the amount of $11,841.74.12
Weir appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court upon finding that its
judgment was in direct contravention of the established statutory
precedent of Georgia Business Corporation Code section 14-2-204.126
The court held that to be liable for preincorporation transactions, the
statute requires persons purporting to act on behalf of a corporation not
yet formed possess actual culpable knowledge that the corporation's
charter had not yet been issued at the time of the act." 7 Common law
promoter liability assigns liability to a promoter-agent if there is no
principal, regardless of knowledge. There was no evidence that Weir
"purported" to act on behalf of the corporation "knowing" it was not in
existence. 2
C. ShareholderDirect Action
(i) "Special Injury" Rule Adopted for Determining Whether
Direct Claim for Misappropriation of Corporate Funds by
Fiduciary of Widely-Held Corporation is Allowed. In the 1983
case of Thomas v. Dickson,'29 the Georgia Supreme Court recognized

[I]f one contracts as agent, when in fact he has no principal, he will be personally
liable. A promoter, though he may assume to act on behalf of the projected
corporation and not for himself, cannot be treated as an agent of the corporation,
for it is not yet in existence; and he will be personally liable on his contract, unless
the other party agreed to look to some other person or fund for payment.).
123. 213 Ga. App. at 833, 446 S.E.2d at 186. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-23 (codified the
common law theory of "promoter liability," but replaced by O.C.G.A. § 14-2-204, which
added a knowledge requirement).
124. 213 Ga. App. at 833, 446 S.E.2d at 186-87.
125. Id., 446 S.E.2d at 187.
126. Id. at 835, 446 S.E.2d at 188.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 250 Ga. 772, 301 S.E.2d 49 (1983).
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the general rule that "a shareholder seeking to recover misappropriated
corporate funds may only bring a derivative suit."' Despite the rule,
the court in Thomas allowed a minority shareholder of a close corporation to maintain a direct action against the majority shareholders for
misappropriation of corporate funds since the plaintiff was the sole
injured shareholder and concerns related to multiplicity of suits,
prejudice to other shareholders and protection of creditors were not
implicated."' In reaching its decision, however, the court assumed,
without deciding, that misappropriation of corporate funds was primarily
derivative in nature and not a direct injury.132 Consequently, the
question of whether a direct action would be available to a shareholder
who suffers a direct injury remained unanswered.
The Georgia Supreme Court supplied an answer in the October 1994
case of Grace Brothers, Ltd. v. Farley Industries, Inc. 33 The case
stemmed from a board-approved tender offer made by William Farley for
all of the outstanding stock of West Point Pepperell ("WPP"), resulting
in Farley's' M successful acquisition of 95% of the stock of WPP for $58
per share.'35 During the tender offer negotiations, WPP and West
Point Acquisition Corporation executed a merger agreement in which the
parties agreed to use their best efforts to merge WPP with West Point
Tender Corporation and then pay the remaining shareholders in WPP
$58 per share upon consummation of the merger.136
Two years later the parties formally terminated the merger agreement
after Farley announced the merger could not be completed because of
financial problems.'37 The minority shareholders subsequently filed
suit asserting multiple claims, directly (e.g. individually) and derivatively, against Farley, WPP, and WPP's officers and directors. 3 ' The
plaintiffs requested specific performance or, in the alternative, damages

130. Id. at 774, 301 S.E.2d at 50.
131. Id. at 775, 301 S.E.2d at 51. See O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-940(a)(1) and 14-2-941(a).
Today, these statutory provisions authorize a shareholder in a statutory close corporation
to petition the superior court for relief, including damages, if the directors "have acted, are
acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial
to the petitioner, whether in his capacity as shareholder, director, or officer of the
corporation." O.C.G.A. § 14-2-940(a)(1).
132. 250 Ga. at 774 n.1, 301 S.E.2d at 51 n.1.
133. 264 Ga. 817, 450 S.E.2d 814 (1994).
134. Farley used several companies to purchase WPP, including Farley Industries, Inc.,
West Point Tender Corporation and West Point Acquisition Corporation. 264 Ga. at 817
n.1, 450 S.E.2d at 815 n.1. Hereinafter, "Farley" means these acquisition companies.
135. 264 Ga. at 817, 450 S.E.2d at 815.
136. Id.
137. Id.

138. Id. at 817-18, 450 S.E.2d at 815.
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for breach of the merger agreement. They also demanded damages for
interference with the merger agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment, corporate waste and violations of the Fair Price Requirements Act.139
After suit was filed, Farley announced plans to complete the merger
14
and force the cash-out of the minority shareholders at $46 per share. 1
The plaintiffs tried to enjoin the merger, but were unsuccessful.14 The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue."' The defendants also moved for summary judgment.1 43 The court granted both motions and entered judgment in
favor of the defendants. 144
The plaintiffs appealed, but the merger was completed in December
1993 and WPP became West Point Stevens.1 45 Two of the minority
shareholders accepted the $46 per share merger price and tendered their
shares. 146 A third minority shareholder, Lanier,' 4 dissented and
pursued his statutory appraisal remedy.1 4' Nonetheless, the appeal
was still pursued.
The Georgia Supreme Court easily rejected the plaintiffs' derivative
claims since those claims were contrary to well settled law which holds
that "a former shareholder in a merged corporation has no standing to
maintain a shareholder's derivative action."149 Georgia Business
Corporation Code section 14-2-741 requires the continuation of shareholder status throughout the derivative action.
Determining whether the plaintiffs had standing to assert their direct
claims was a more difficult question for the court since it had failed to
address the issue in Thomas of whether a direct action would be
available to a shareholder who suffers a direct injury. Recognizing that
a rule was needed, the court looked to Delaware law.'50

139. Id. at 818, 450 S.E.2d at 815.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.

143. Id.
144. Id.
145.

Id.

146. Id.

147. Lanier was the President and CEO of WPP at the time of Farley's initial tender
offer, but he did not tender any of his 22,000 shares. Id. at 818 n.2, 450 S.E.2d at 815 n.2.
148. Id., 450 S.E.2d at 815. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1301 (statutory appraisal process).
149. 264 Ga. at 818, 450 S.E.2d at 816 (citing Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618
(3d Cir. 1991); Portnoy v. Kawecki Berylco Indus., Inc., 607 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1979)).

150. Id. at 819, 450 S.E.2d at 816 (citing In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litigation, 634
A.2d 319 (Del. 1993)). See Holland v. Holland Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 208 Ga.
App. 794, 432 S.E.2d 238 (1993) (the Georgia Court of Appeals applying the Delaware
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Under Delaware law, a shareholder may maintain a direct action upon
allegations of a "special injury," which is (1) an injury that is separate
and distinct from that shared by other shareholders or (2) a wrong
involving a contractual right of a shareholder which exists independently
of any right of the corporation."' 1 The court fully adopted the Delaware
test and held that "outside the context ofa close corporation,a shareholder must be injured in a way which is different from the other shareholders or independently of the corporation to have standing to assert a
direct action."" 2
The court found that except for the claim for breach of fiduciary duty,
all of the plaintiffs' claims were derivative in nature. On the other
hand, the plaintiffs' claim for breach of fiduciary duty to minority
shareholders based on failure to seek consummation of the original
merger agreement met the newly adopted test for establishing standing
to assert a direct claim. 5 ' The injury asserted was a "special injury"
because only the minority shareholders would have received $58 per
share after the originally planned merger.'5 ' The court stated:
"Where, as here, it is sufficiently alleged that the effect of the controlling
stockholders' self-serving manipulation of the corporate affairs causes a
singular economic injury to minority interests alone, the minority have
stated a cause of action for 'special' injury .... 155
While the plaintiffs normally would have had standing to assert their
direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the court found they could not
maintain the claim since "the statutory appraisal remedy is exclusive
where the shareholder's objection is essentially a complaint about
price."' The plaintiffs argued that since their direct claim for breach
standard).
151. 264 Ga. at 819, 450 S.E.2d at 816.
152. Id. (quoting In re Tri-Star Pictures, 634 A.2d at 332) (emphasis added).
153. Id. The court noted that the director's behavior here was simply violative of their
duty to treat the minority shareholders fairly. See id. at 820 n.7, 450 S.E.2d at 816 n.7.
154. Id. at 819, 450 S.E.2d at 816.
155. Id. at 820, 450 S.E.2d at 816 (quoting In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litigation, 634
A.2d 319, 332 (Del. 1993)).
156. Id. at 820 n.8, 450 S.E.2d at 816 n.8. The court recognized that there are
exceptions to the appraisal remedy which may be invoked when there is a failure to comply
with procedural requirements, or when the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the
corporation or the vote required to obtain approval of the corporate action was obtained by
fraudulent and deceptive means, Id. at 820, 450 S.E.2d at 817 (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-21302(b); Comment Note to 1989 Amendment)). The court also observed that with respect
to the "fraud" exception to the appraisal remedy's exclusivity, "only 'actual fraud,' involving
traditional notions of deception, permits collateral attack on the corporate action. Thus,
a claim that 'a fiduciary has acted unfairly' cannot be used to litigate valuation issues that
are appropriately disposed of in appraisal proceedings.'" Id. at 821 n.11, 450 S.E.2d at 817
n.11 (citing and quoting Comment Note to 1989 Amendment).
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of fiduciary duty could not be raised in a statutory appraisal proceeding,
they should be permitted to pursue this claim independently.'57 To
that end, the minority shareholders asserted their claim was unrelated
to the "fair value" of their shares.' This argument did not withstand
scrutiny. The court found the focus of the direct claim for breach of
fiduciary duty was that the plaintiffs would have received a higher price
per share if the defendants had not breached their fiduciary duty to seek
consummation of the merger agreement."5 9 As such, a remedy beyond
appraisal was unavailable. 60
Further, despite being foreclosed from asserting a direct action for
recovery on grounds of breach of fiduciary duty, in an appraisal the
minority shareholder who objected to the merger and dissented would
recover the "fair value" of his shares prior to the effectuation of the
merger.16' The court noted that "any facts which shed light on the
interests are to be considered in
value of the dissenting shareholders'
62
arriving at 'fair value.'"'

(ii) Thomas v. Dickson Analysis Continues to Apply to Direct
Actions for Misappropriation in the Context of Closely-Held
Corporations. The Thomas v. Dickson163 rationale still applies in
the context of close corporations. In Dunaway v. Parker,64 minority
shareholders of a corporation brought alternative direct and derivative
claims against the corporation's president, who was also the majority
shareholder, for breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiffs claimed the
Although the
president had misappropriated corporate funds.'
defendant did not raise the propriety of bringing a direct claim for
misappropriation of funds in the trial court, the court of appeals opted
to address the issue on appeal since "interests other than those of [the]
creditors and
defendant [were] at stake, i.e., the rights of corporate
66
possibly shareholders not parties to this action."

157.

Id. at 821, 450 S.E.2d at 817.

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing IRA v. Brenner Cos., 419 S.E.2d 354 (1992)).

161. Id., 450 S.E.2d at 818 (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1301(5)).
162. Id. (citing Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 169 Ga. App. 584, 586, 314
S.E.2d 245 (1984)).
163. 250 Ga. 772, 301 S.E.2d 49 (1983).

164. 215 Ga. App. 841, 453 S.E.2d 43 (1994). See discussion infra Part I.E.(i)
(discussing the breach of fiduciary duty aspect of the case).
165. 215 Ga. App. at 841, 453 S.E.2d at 45-46.
166. Id. at 845, 453 S.E.2d at 48.
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The Georgia Court of Appeals first set forth the general rule that a
shareholder seeking to recover misappropriated corporate funds may
only bring a derivative suit.'67 It then quoted Thomas to explain the
reasons for the rule, namely:
1) it prevents a multiplicity of lawsuits by shareholders; 2) it protects
corporate creditors by putting the proceeds of the recovery back in the
corporation; 3) it protects the interests of all shareholders by increasing
the value of their shares, instead of allowing a recovery by one shareholder to prejudice the rights of others not party to the suit; and 4) it
adequately compensates the injured shareholder by increasing the
value of his shares.16
Thus, if a direct recovery would prejudice other parties (e.g., creditors or
169
other shareholders), then a direct recovery should not be allowed.
On the other hand, "a direct action is permissible when such prejudice
is unlikely and the 'realistic objectives' of avoiding unfair access or
distribution of corporate assets (committed or derived as a result of
litigation) to one side
over the other are more effectively accomplished
170
via a direct action."

The court of appeals found the trial jury below was properly allowed
to consider the plaintiffs' alternative claim for direct relief.171

It

reached this conclusion after deciding that creditors of the corporation
would not be prejudiced by the plaintiffs' direct recovery, that a
multiplicity of lawsuits was unlikely, and that the jury was properly
charged as to the alternative claims and apportionment of damages.' 72
D. ShareholderDerivative Suits
(i) Shareholder's Right to Pursue Derivative Action Not
Terminated When Corporation Sues Group Other Than Directors
Accused. In McKoon v. Jones,73 McKoon, a shareholder of The
Citizens Bank and of its holding company, Northwest Georgia Financial
Corporation, brought a derivative suit against several officers and board
members of both corporations, claiming they had wasted corporate assets
through negligence and violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced

167. Id.
168. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Dickson, 250 Ga. 772, 301 S.E.2d 49 (1983)).
169. Id.

170. Id. at 845-46, 453 S.E.2d at 48 (quoting Thomas v. Dickson, 250 Ga. 772, 301
S.E.2d 49 (1983)).
171. Id. at 846, 453 S.E.2d at 49.
172. Id.
173. 214 Ga. App. 40, 447 S.E.2d 50 (1994), cert. granted December 5, 1994.
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and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO Act")." 4 Seveial of the defendant-directors moved to dismiss the derivative action on various
grounds, one of which was that the shareholders' right to pursue a
derivative action terminated when Citizens Bank filed suit against its
surety to recover on a fidelity bond after McKoon demanded that action
be taken against the defendants. 75 The board members maintained
below that the derivative action should be dismissed because the board
demonstrated an appropriate reaction to the shareholders' complaint by
pursuing any wrongdoing and suing the surety on the fidelity bond.17
The trial court granted the defendant's motion solely on that ground.177
The court's decision was based on Comment 4 to Georgia Business
Corporation Code section 14-2-742, which reads:
There is no obligation on the part of the corporation to respond to the
demand. However, if the corporation, after receiving the demand,
decides to institute litigation or, after a derivative proceeding has
commenced, decides to assume control of the litigation, the shareholder's right to commence or control the proceeding ends unless it can be
shown that the corporation will not adequately pursue the matter. 7 '
McKoon contended on appeal that the trial court erred in deciding the
Comment precluded her from maintaining the derivative suit.179 The
court of appeals agreed and reversed the trial court."18 The court
restated the rule that the comments to the Georgia Business Corporation
Code were not "'a statement of legislative intention by the General
Assembly of Georgia nor do they have the force of statutory law. ' "l"
But, as the2 court recognized, the comments may serve as persuasive
18
authority.

The court further determined that even if Comment 4 did apply, the
directors' action against a surety for losses resulting from dishonest or
fraudulent acts committed by the bank's employees was not the same as
a response against the officers and directors for violation of duties they

174. Id. at 40,447 S.E.2d at 50-51. Georgia's RICO Act is codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-141 (1992).
175. 214 Ga. App. at 40, 447 S.E.2d at 51.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-742 cmit. 4 (1994).
179. 214 Ga. App. at 40, 447 S.E.2d at 51.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 41,447 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting O.C.G.A., Title 14, Chapter 2 (1989), p. 11, and
also referencing O.C.G.A., Title 14, Chapter 2 (Supp. 1993, p. 1)). See Service Corp. Int'l
v. H.M. Patterson & Sons, Inc. 263 Ga. 412, 415, 434 S.E.2d 455, 458 (1993).
182. 214 Ga. App. at 41, 447 S.E.2d at 51.
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owed the corporation and whether these officers and directors were liable
for damages for the losses of the corporation.183 Finally, the court
stated that its interpretation of Comment 4 does not prohibit the
commencement of a shareholder's derivative action once the corporation
files suit, without regard to the type of suit filed or the defendants
named by the corporation.'M The court did not believe it was the
legislature's intention to allow officers and directors who commit fraud
or negligently perform their duties to avoid a derivative suit by filing an
action against the corporation's surety."M
(ii) Implied Actual Authority Vested in CEO of Close Corporation through Acquiescence of Minority Shareholders. In Morris
v. Williams,186 minority shareholders brought a derivative action
against a closely-held corporation's chief executive officer ("CEO"), who
was also the majority shareholder, asserting the CEO abused and
commingled corporate funds. 7 The trial court entered judgment on
a jury verdict in favor of the CEO."
The minority shareholders
appealed, arguing the trial court erred in charging the jury that "'those
powers inherent in the office of president [of the corporation include]..
the apparent powers which the corporation permits him to exercise
without objection."'189 The court of appeals essentially held that the
minority shareholders were estopped from raising a breach of fiduciary
duty claim against the majority shareholder-CEO because of their
acquiescence to such acts in the past through failure to object to them.
On appeal, the CEO contended the jury charge was a proper statement
of the law as promulgated by the Georgia Supreme Court in Garmany
v. Lawton."9 The court said Garmany stood for the proposition that:
[Wihen there is no board of directors or the directors are inactive and
the executive officer discharges its duties, and the shareholders by
direct act or acquiescence invest the executive officer with the powers
and functions of the board of directors as a continuous and permanent
arrangement, his acts are valid as "against the corporation, or a
creditor," even though they may not have been authorized by formal
vote.1 9

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id. at 42, 447 S.E.2d at 52.
Id.
214 Ga. App. 526, 448 S.E.2d 267 (1994).
Id. at 526, 448 S.E.2d at 268.

188. Id.
189. Id. at 527, 448 S.E.2d at 268.
190. 124 Ga. 876(1), 53 S.E. 669 (1906).
191. 214 Ga. App. at 527, 448 S.E.2d at 268-69.
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Importantly, Garmany did not state the concept of "apparent
authority" because such authority arises only when a principal leads a
third party to reasonably believe the agent has authority, even though
the agent does not. 9 ' Consequently, the trial court's charge to the
jury which referred to "apparent powers" was imprecise, since, as
between the agent-CEO and the principal-corporation, the CEO could not
have had apparent authority.193 Instead, the CEO had only "such
actual, implied, or inherent powers as the law [gave] him or may have
arisen out of special circumstances arising out of the conduct of the
[principal-corporation]." 19' The court of appeals found, however, that
the incorrect reference to apparent powers was "harmless inadvertence"
because
the trial court had otherwise stated the law correctly during the
95
case. 1
The court then found the trial court did not err in charging the jury
that the CEO could have had authority by the acquiescence of the
minority shareholders."9
Evidence had been presented that the
minority shareholders failed to object to the CEO's alleged abuse and
commingling of corporate funds. 97 Moreover, the court noted: (1) the
corporation leased and maintained vehicles for the minority shareholders
as well as the CEO; (2) the parties regularly met to discuss corporate
business; (3) the minority shareholders were aware of expenditures and
had access to the corporate checkbook; and (4) the minority shareholders
had received loans from the corporation and had received benefits
similar to those the CEO gave himself. 19 Hence, the trial court's
judgment was affirmed.
E.

Breach of FiduciaryDuty

(i) CEO Breaches Fiduciary Duty in Asset Sale Transaction and
Loses Statutory Immunity from Liability by Failing to Disclose
Conflict of Interest. In Dunaway v. Parker,'99 minority shareholders of a close corporation sued the corporation's president, who was also

192. Id., 448 S.E.2d at 269.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 527-28, 448 S.E.2d at 269.
199. 215 Ga. App. 841, 453 S.E.2d 43 (1994). This case was also discussed in Part
I.C.(ii)., supra, insofar as it addresses the propriety of direct actions for misappropriation
of corporate funds in the context of closely-held corporations.
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the majority shareholder, for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with
the asset sale of the corporation to a competitor.2' The Georgia Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment entered on a jury verdict
in favor of the plaintiffs." 1
The appeal stemmed from a long-standing dispute between the
plaintiffs, minority shareholders of Dunaway Drug Stores, Inc. ("Dunaway Drugs"), and the corporation's CEO, William B. Dunaway.2
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant-chief executive officer breached
his fiduciary duties by furthering his own interests, at the expense of the
corporation, while negotiating and closing the asset sale of Dunaway
Drugs to Jack Eckerd Corporation ("Eckerd Drugs").0 3 The specific
allegations were that the defendant: (1) improperly allocated $300,000
and a company car to himself in exchange for a covenant not to compete
with Eckerd Drugs for three years; (2) improperly amended two
corporate leases (wherein the defendant was the landlord) prior to
negotiating the asset sale thereby devaluing Dunaway Drugs' leasehold
interests; and (3) engaged in numerous instances of self-dealing, usurped
corporate opportunities and misappropriated corporate funds.20 4
The defendant flatly denied the allegations, maintaining the sale was
fair to Dunaway Drugs and its shareholders.0 5 He further argued
that the sale was unanimously approved by Dunaway Drugs' shareholders and by its board of directors, which included two of the plaintiffs and
three members who had no financial stake in the transaction.2" The
defendant-chief executive officer claimed that such approval, coupled
with the fact that two of the plaintiffs abstained from the vote, estopped
the plaintiffs from asserting their claim.0 7
At trial below, the court found the defendant had acted covertly on a
number of occasions to benefit himself at the expense of Dunaway Drugs'
bottom line and had breached his fiduciary duties to the corporation and
its shareholders. 0" The court also found the defendant did not disclose
to the minority shareholders or other corporate directors his conflicts of
interest in the transaction. Thus, under Georgia Business Corporation
Code sections 14-2-860(4), 14-2-861(b)(1) and 14-2-862(a), the defendant,
as an officer of the corporation, was not entitled to statutory immunity

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

215 Ga. App. at 841, 453 S.E.2d at 45.
Id. at 850, 453 S.E.2d at 52.
Id. at 841, 453 S.E.2d at 45.
Id.
Id., 453 S.E.2d at 45-46.
Id., 453 S.E.2d at 46.
Id.

207. Id.
208. Id. at 841-50, 453 S.E.2d at 46-52.
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from 2liability
because he failed to make the required conflicts disclo9
sure.

0

The court also concluded that those plaintiffs who abstained from the
Board vote on the transaction were not estopped from pursuing their
claim.2 10 Acquiescence in or ratification of an act must be voluntary.21
Here, the defendant failed to fully disclose material facts
about the transaction. Therefore, the plaintiffs were not estopped from
maintaining their claim on grounds that the plaintiffs assented to the
transactions. 1
(ii) No Fiduciary Duty Owed to Purchaser of Business. The
case, Mail & Media, Inc. v. Rotenberry,"' had its beginnings in the
1990 sale by Mr. Rotenberry of his wholly-owned corporation, Mail &
Media, Inc. to Sullivan Graphics, Inc. 1 4 In connection with the sale,
Mr. and Mrs. Rotenberry entered into a noncompetition agreement with
Mail & Media which provided for the payment of $3 million. 21 5

Mr.

Rotenberry also entered into an employment agreement with Mail &
Media which provided for an initial three-year term at an annual salary
of

$300,000.216

In May 1992, Mr. Rotenberry died." 7

Mail & Media

subsequently refused to make any payments to Mrs. Rotenberry,
asserting that its obligations under the noncompete and employment
agreements had ceased.1 8 Mrs. Rotenberry filed suit against Mail &
Media for breach of the agreements. 1 9 Mail & Media counterclaimed,
alleging breach of fiduciary duty by the Rotenberrys while they were
officers of Mail & Media. " The trial court entered judgment for Mrs.
Rotenberry, and Mail & Media appealed.'
Mail & Media argued the lower court erred by finding in favor of Mrs.
Rotenberry with respect to the noncompete agreement because the
agreement was a personal service contract and, therefore, all of its

209. Id. at 847, 453 S.E.2d at 49-50.
210. Id. at 848, 453 S.E.2d at 50.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 213 Ga. App. 826, 446 S.E.2d 517 (1994).
214. The company still operated under the name of Mail & Media after the sale to
Sullivan Graphics.
215. Id. at 826, 446 S.E.2d at 518.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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obligations under the agreement ended after Mr. Rotenberry died.222
After noting the question presented was one of first impression, the court
adopted the rule that a noncompetition agreement standing alone, with
no affirmative promises, is not a personal services contract, and,
2 3 The
therefore, does not terminate upon the death of the promisor."
noncompete agreement contained no affirmative promises in this
case.24 Consequently, Mail & Media's obligation did not end upon Mr.
Rotenberry's death.22
Mail & Media then argued the trial court erred in concluding that
Mrs. Rotenberry was entitled to payment under the employment
agreement as executrix of Mr. Rotenberry's estate as provided in the
agreement.2 26 Mail & Media contended that it was relieved of its
obligation because the Rotenberrys breached their fiduciary duties to the
company. 227 The principal allegation was that before Mr. Rotenberry
sold his company to Mail & Media, he jeopardized the continued
relationship of the company with its largest customer, Bi-Lo, Inc., by
setting up a reserve account for Bi-Lo.228 Mail & Media argued that
certain payments were made from that account for "unusual" expenses,
including the personal expenses of Bi-Lo's advertising director, which led
to the loss of the Bi-Lo account.229 Mail & Media further contended
that the Rotenberrys breached their fiduciary duties to Mail & Media by
making unauthorized payments through the reserve account and by
failing to disclose the existence of the account both prior to the sale of
the company and afterwards while Mr. Rotenberry was acting President. 230
The court held that Mr. Rotenberry did not owe a fiduciary duty to the
buyer of his company during the time the parties were negotiating the
sale of the company because, under O.C.G.A. section 23-2-58, a fiduciary
or confidential relationship did not exist between the parties. 23 That
section provides that a fiduciary or confidential relationship arises where
"cone party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the

222. Id.
223. Id. at 827, 446 S.E.2d at 519. The court adopted the rule of Sanfillippo v. Oehler,
869 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. App. 1993) and TPS Freight Distrib. v. Texas Commerce
Bank-Dallas, 788 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. App. 1990). Id.
224. 213 Ga. App. at 826, 446 S.E.2d at 519.
225. Id. at 827, 446 S.E.2d at 519.
226. Id. at 828, 446 S.E.2d at 519.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id., 446 S.E.2d at 519-20.
231. Id., 446 S.E.2d at 520.
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will, conduct and interest of another or where, from a similar relationship of mutual confidence, the law requires the utmost good faith, such
as the relationship between partners, principal and agent, etc."232 The
court also noted that, given the right set of facts, a confidential
relationship may exist between businessmen.' But the mere fact that
one party to a deal trusts and confides in another does not establish a
fiduciary or confidential relationship.234 The court observed that the
employees of the purchaser were informed of the reserve account, but the
purchaser did not exercise due diligence in conducting further inquiry.235

F

Dissenter'sRights & Exclusivity of AppraisalRemedy
See supra text accompanying notes 133-162.

G. Stand Alone Noncompetition Agreement Ancillary to the Sale of a
Business is Not PersonalServices Contract
See supra text accompanying notes 213-225.
H. Authority of the Comments to the Georgia Business Corporation
Code.
See supra text accompanying notes 173-182.
I. Legislative Changes
During the 1995 session, the legislature made several amendments to
the Georgia Business Corporation Code.236
(i) Voting Entitlement of Shares. Former law provided that with
certain exceptions each outstanding share is entitled to one vote at a
shareholders' meeting.237 A 1995 amendment excepted shares of
preferred stock issued before July 1, 1989, from the above rule." s The
amendment also provided that an amendment or restatement to the
articles of incorporation made on or after July 1, 1989 will not be
deemed to have granted voting rights to preferred shares unless the
amendment gave the holders of preferred stock voting rights, the

232. O.C.G.A. § 23-2-58 (1982).
233.

213 Ga. App. at 828, 446 S.E.2d at 520.

234. Id. at 828-29, 446 S.E.2d at 520.
235. Id. at 829, 446 S.E.2d at 520.
236. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-101 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
237. Id. § 14-2-721 (1994).
238. Id. § 14-2-721(a) (Supp. 1995).
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shareholders were given appropriate notice of the amendment, and a
shareholder vote approved the restatement or amendment.239
(ii) Resignation and Removal of Officers. The 1995 amendment
to O.C.G.A. section 14-2-843 provides that unless otherwise stated in the
bylaws, any officer appointed by an authorized officer24 may be
removed at any time with or without cause by any officer having
authority to appoint such officer.24'
(iii) Reinstatement Following Administrative Dissolution. Under the 1995 amendments to Article 14, an administratively
dissolved corporation now has five years from the effective date 2 of
42
dissolution to apply to the Secretary of State for reinstatement.
Prior law only allowed such corporations to apply for reinstatement
within two years from the date of dissolution.2 43 There were additional
ministerial changes to section 14-2-1422.
(iv) Corporate Name. A minor addition to the "corporate name"
provision was enacted, which requires a corporate name to be distinguishable from the name of a limited liability company formed or
authorized to transact business in Georgia.
(v) Authority of Foreign Corporation to Transact Business. Some changes were made with respect to activities considered
"transacting business" within Georgia. If a foreign corporation is
"transacting business" within the state, then it must qualify by
procuring a certificate of authority from the Secretary of State before
doing business.245 Under the 1995 amendments, the fact that a foreign
corporation owns or controls another entity in Georgia does not, without
more, constitute "transacting business" and, therefore, qualification is
not necessary.24 A provision related to acting as a general partner of
a limited partnership was deleted.247

239. Id.

240. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-840(b) (1994) ("A duly appointed officer may appoint one or
more officers or assistant officers if authorized by the bylaws or the board of directors.").

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

O.C.G.A. § 14-2-843 (Supp. 1995).
Id. § 14-2-1422(a).
Id.
Id. §§ 14-2-401(b)(6) (Supp. 1995), 14-2-403 (1994).
Id. § 14-2-1501(a) (1994).
Id. § 14-2-1501(b)(13) (Supp. 1995).

247. Id. § 14-2-1501(b)(14).
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11.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES

During the survey period, the Georgia Limited Liability Company Act
("LLC Act") was amended in several respects. 4 ' Most of the amendments were simple textual changes and need not be addressed further.
Several changes do, however, deserve attention.
Duties
Prior to its amendment, the "Duties" provision of the LLC Act249
imposed no duties on non-manager members toward the LLC or its other
members solely by reason of being a member. 5 ' Under the amended
provision, the articles of organization or a written operating agreement
may impose duties on its non-manager members qua members.25 '
Thus, the prior law's provision is merely a default provision.

A.

B. Dissolution
The dissolution provision contained in Article 6 of the LLC Act was
changed to exclude the removal of a member, the assignment by a
member of his entire LLC interest, and the voluntary disassociation of
for purposes of determining
a member from events of25disassociation
2
when an LLC is dissolved.

C. Foreign LLC-TransactingBusiness
The amendments added an additional activity which, if taken alone,
would not rise to the level of "transacting business," namely, "[o]wning,
without more, real or personal property."25 3 Further, prior law's
exclusion for the activity of owning or controlling another entity
organized under Georgia law or transacting business in Georgia was
by inserting the phrase "directly or indirectly" after "ownsolidified
25 4

ing.

,

248. Id. §§ 14-11-100 to 1109 (1994 & Supp. 1995). Fora thorough discussion of limited
liability companies in Georgia see ROBERT P. BRYANT, PATRICK G. JoNEs & CHARLES R.
BEAUDROT, JR., GEORGIA LLC/LLP HANDBOOK (1995) [hereinafter GEORGIA LLC/LLP
HANDBOOK].

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

O.C.G.A. § 14-11-305 (1994).
Id. § 14-11-305(1).
Id. § 14-11-305(1) (Supp. 1995).
Id. § 14-11-602(4). See O.C.G.A. §§ 14-11-601(a), 14-11-502(6) (1994).
O.C.G.A. § 14-11-702(bX9) (Supp. 1995).
Id. § 14-11-702(13).
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D. Mergers
Article 9 on mergers was also amended in several respects. LLCs may
now merge with any business entity, including corporations, as long as
the statute governing the other entity does not prohibit the merger.255
The remainder of the Article was amended to reflect this change.
Conforming changes were made to the limited partnership provisions of
the Georgia Limited Liability Company Act to expressly allow mergers
between LLCs and limited partnerships.2 56
LLCs may merge with Georgia corporations if the corporation is the
surviving entity since the definition of "joint-stock association" 7
should be read to include LLCs.258 Another option for accomplishing
the same merger (i.e., corporation surviving) is to merge the LLC into a
foreign corporation, then merge the foreign corporation into the Georgia
corporation.2 9 On the other hand, if the objective is to have the
Georgia LLC be the surviving entity, then a Georgia corporation could
merge into a foreign corporation, then the foreign corporation could
merge into the Georgia LLC. 6 0
Lastly, an additional paragraph was added to the provision on the
effects of merger to provide that if a foreign business entity which is
authorized to do business in Georgia merges with an LLC and is the
disappearing entity, then such LLC does not need to obtain a certificate
of withdrawal from the Secretary of State." 1
III.

PARTNERSHIPS

A Court Authorized to Order that a Limited Partner'sCharged
Interest be Foreclosed by Judicial Sale and May Be Purchasedby
Judgment Creditor
In Nigri v. Lotz,"' a judgment creditor, Nigri, filed a Uniform
Limited Partnership Act section 14-9A-52 petition with the trial court
asking the court (1) to charge the judgment debtor, Lotz's, partnership
interest in two limited partnerships with payment of the unsatisfied

255. See O.C.G.A. § 14-11-901(a) (Supp. 1995); see also GEORGIA LLC/LLP HANDBOOK,
supra note 248, at 33.
256. GEORGIA LLC/LLP HANDBOOK, supra note 248, at 33.
257. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1109(a)(1) (1994) (defining "joint-stock association").

258. GEORGIA LLC/LLP HANDBOOK, supra note 248, at 33.
259, Id.

260. Id.
261. O.C.G.A. § 14-11-901(d) (Supp. 1995).
262. 216 Ga. App. 204, 453 S.E.2d 780 (1995).
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amount of the judgment and (2) to order Lotz to transfer his partnership
interests to Nigri in partial satisfaction of the judgment debt.263 The
trial court entered a charging order against Lotz's partnership interests,
but rejected Nigri's request to transfer Lotz's partnership interests
directly to him.264 In Nigri's appeal, he asserted that the trial court
erred by not granting an order to transfer the partnership interests.266
found the trial court did not err in refusing to order
The court of appeals
66
2

the transfer.

The court explained that in aid of a charging order courts are
authorized to "appoint a receiver and make all other orders, directions,
and inquiries which the circumstances of the case require."267 The
court went on to hold that in connection with a charging order, a court
"is authorized to order that a limited partner's charged interest be
foreclosed by judicial sale at which the partnership interest may be
purchased by the judgment creditor or a third party."26 But such
action is at the discretion of the court issuing the charging order.269
Nonetheless, Nigri did not seek a foreclosure sale. Instead, he had
asked the trial court to affix a value to the charged partnership interests
and then to transfer the interests to him in partial satisfaction of the
judgment debt. 270 The court of appeals noted further that the trial
court was right, but for the wrong reasons. The trial court had
erroneously concluded that such a transfer would effectively substitute
Nigri as a limited partner.27 '
The court of appeals is certainly correct in this ruling. To have
concluded otherwise would have given a judgment creditor the power of
limited partner substitution, which should always be reserved for the
general partner of a limited partnership.
B. Execution of Written Instrument in Furtheranceof Business May
Not Bind Partner
In Willard v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co.,272 the Georgia Supreme
Court had to decide whether two individuals who formed a corporation
to build homes were partners and, if so, whether a note executed by one
263.

Id. at 204, 453 S.E.2d at 781.

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 207, 453 S.E.2d at 784.
Id. at 205, 453 S.E.2d at 782 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-9A-52(a)).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 206, 453 S.E.2d at 783.
Id. at 207, 453 S.E.2d at 783-84.
Id., 453 S.E.2d at 784.
264 Ga. 555, 448 S.E.2d 696 (1994).
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of them, Coburn, in his individual capacity would bind the other partner,
Willard, given the execution of the note furthered the goals of the
partnership, but there was no evidence the maker of the note was ever
The Court reversed the court of
authorized to bind his partner. 7
appeals and held that Coburn's execution of the note did not bind
Willard even though it furthered their business. 4
The facts indicate that Coburn and Willard formed a corporation, OBU
Construction & Development, Inc. ("OBU Construction"), to operate a
home construction business.7 5 The corporation obtained a construction
loan, which both Coburn and Willard guaranteed, and used the funds to
build a house.2 76 The house had not yet been sold by the time the loan
became due. 77 So Coburn borrowed money from a bank, executed a
note naming the bank as payee, and bought the house. 78 Although
the loan was executed in Coburn's name, Willard actually arranged for
the loan.2 79 Further, Willard completed the loan application, paid for
an appraisal of the property, reviewed the closing documents, and
attended the closing.280 OBU Construction also reimbursed Coburn for
the down payment and made a couple of payments on the note. 1
When Coburn later sold the house, Willard shared in the sale proceeds.28 2
Coburn later became liable on the note, which should have been paid
The plaintiff alleged that
off by another financial institution. 2'
Coburn and Willard were jointly and severally liable on the note as
partners, even though the note was executed individually by Coburn.2'
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held
that Willard was not liable on the note.2" 5 The court stated that even
assuming Coburn and Willard were partners rather than just shareholders in OBU Construction, the record on appeal did not support finding
Willard liable on the note.286 The court commented that Willard's

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 555, 448 S.E.2d at 696.
Id.
Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Coburn, 211 Ga. App. 357, 439 S.E.2d 69 (1993).
Id. at 359, 439 S.E.2d at 71.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 359-60, 439 S.E.2d at 71-72.
264 Ga. at 555, 448 S.E.2d at 697.
Id. at 556, 448 S.E.2d at 697.
Id.
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name did not appear on any of the loan documents." 7 The court
rejected the court of appeals' contention that Willard would be liable on
the note even though he did not sign it because "'the note was executed
in furtherance of the goals of a partnership between Coburn and Willard
....
"
The Georgia Supreme Court found that in the context of a
written instrument
such an assertion reads the Uniform Partnership Act
28 9
too broadly.

Even if they were partners, said the Court, liability could not attach
to Willard under the above section because the note was not executed in
the partnership's name, nor did Willard give authorization to be
bound.29' Thus, the general rule of O.C.G.A. section 11-3-401(1)
applied.'
That section provides that "[nlo person is liable on an
instrument unless his signature appears thereon.'"292
C. Duties of a Limited Partnershipand its Limited PartnersWhen
They Wrongfully Receive Money or Property
In Adler v. Hertling,23 Hertling, a limited partner in Sahara
Club/Desert Village Associates Limited Partnership ("Sahara Club"),
brought suit individually and on behalf of Sahara Club against Stone
Harbor Limited Partnership ("Stone Harbor") and its individual limited
partners for statutory conversion of partnership funds.2'
Sahara Club was formed to own and operate Regency Park apartments
in Atlanta.2' Stone Harbor was formed to own and operate certain
Stone Harbor townhouses in Atlanta.296 Stone Harbor and Sahara
Club had a common general partner, Jules Aaronson.2 97 Regency Park
apartments and Stone Harbor townhouses were managed by Jason
Property Management Company ("Jason").298 Aaronson also had a
financial interest in Jason. 99
In 1987, Sahara Club refinanced its Regency Park property and
deposited the $2.8 million proceeds it received from the refinancing into

287.
288.
289,
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id.
Id. at 555, 448 S.E.2d at 697.
Id. See O.C.G.A. § 14-8-9(1)-(2) (1994).
264 Ga. at 555, 448 S.E.2d at 697.
Id. at 556, 448 S.E.2d at 697.
Id.
215 Ga. App. 769, 451 S.E.2d 91 (1994).
Id. at 769, 451 S.E.2d at 93.
Id.
Id.
Id., 451 S.E.2d at 94.
Id.
Id.
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Sahara Club's operating account.300 Several days later over $1.8
million of the proceeds were transferred from the Sahara Club account
to the "Jason Property Management Trust Account" ("Jason Account").3 "1 Jason used this account to aggregate the funds of the
entities it managed, make overnight investments with those funds, and
return the funds to the entities the next day with interest.0"
Jason and a number of the entities it managed, including Sahara
Club, entered into an "Investo-Matic Agreement" with a bank, which
provided: "'Company and Owners agree that all funds in the various
accounts of the Communities are to be held by Company in escrow for the
benefit only of the Community from which the funds were derived
.. ,303
This agreement was signed by Jason's president, by a
representative of the bank, and by Aaronson, as a general partner of
various entities, including Sahara Club."°4
On the day the funds were transferred from Sahara Club's operating
account to the Jason Account, Aaronson, as general partner of Sahara
Club, effectuated the distribution of approximately $2 million from the
Jason Account to Stone Harbor's limited partners.0 5 These distributions were made to the limited partners on account of their contributions
to Stone Harbor.30 6 The trial court found that at least $1.3 million of
the $2 million transferred to Stone Harbor and its limited partners
belonged to Sahara Club.0" This prompted the suit by Hertling on
behalf of Sahara Club against Stone Harbor and its limited partners.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Hertling and an appeal
followed.30 8
The court of appeals found that Hertling's statutory conversion claim
against Stone Harbor under Uniform Partnership Act contained in
O.C.G.A. section 14-8-14 had merit.3°9 That section reads:
The partnership is bound to make good the loss:
(1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent
authority receives money or property of a third person and misapplies
it;
and

300. Id. at 769-70, 451 S.E.2d at 94.
301. Id. at 770, 451 S.E.2d at 94.
302. Id,

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 770-71, 451 SE.2d at 94.

309. Id. at 775, 451 S.E.2d at 98.
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(2) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives
money or property of a third person and the money or property so
received is misapplied by any partner while it is in the custody of the
partnership.3 10
Aaronson gave testimony that while acting as general partner of Stone
Harbor, he caused Sahara Club funds to be transferred to the limited
partners of Stone Harbor because of their contributions to that
partnership.3 11 This, the court noted, violated the terms of the InvestoMatic Agreement and Sahara Club's partnership agreement and,
therefore, was a misapplication of funds, making Stone Harbor liable to
Sahara Club for conversion under the statute. 12 The court also found
Stone Harbor's limited partners severally liable to Sahara Club for
conversion due to the operation of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
section 14-9A-48, which states that "[a] limited partner holds as trustee
for the partnership: ... [mioney or other property wrongfully paid or
conveyed to him on account of his contribution." 3 3
D.

Implied Duty of Good Faith in PartnershipAgreement

Howard v. Hammond,314 concerned a dispute over the dissolution of
an insurance agency partnership in which the plaintiff, Hammond,
alleged counts of breach of contract and wrongful dissolution. 15 The
lower court entered judgment on a jury verdict for the plaintiff and the
defendant, Howard, appealed."1 6
The evidence in the case demonstrated that despite an at-will
termination provision in the partnership agreement, Howard wrongfully
kept for herself all the assets and business opportunities of the
partnership and physically excluded Hammond from the partnership's
place of business during the course of dissolving the partnership. 17
Uniform Limited Partnership Act section 23-2-58 holds that "partners
owe a duty to act in 'utmost good faith' with regard to each other."",
This statutory mandate was in existence when the parties entered into
the partnership agreement.3 11 Consequently, the partnership agree-

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318,
319.

O.C.G.A. § 14-8-14 (1994).
215 Ga. App. at 775, 451 S.E.2d at 98.
Id.
O.C.GA. § 14-9A-48(bX2) (1994).
216 Ga. App. 703, 455 S.E.2d 390 (1995).
Id. at 703, 455 S.E.2d at 390-91.
Id. at 705, 455 S.E.2d at 393.
Id.
Id. at 706-07, 455 S.E.2d at 393.
Id. at 706, 455 S.E.2d at 393.
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ment contained an implied duty of good faith, which Howard
breached.32 Importantly, the court of appeals found it was not error
to permit recovery for both the breach of contract claim and the wrongful
dissolution claim.3 21
E. Legislative Changes
(i) The LLP Amendments. In 1995, the legislature amended
Georgia's general partnership statute322 to authorize Georgia general
partnerships to elect limited liability partnership ("LLP") status.3 23
The LLP Amendments became effective on July 1, 1995.
The main characteristic of a Georgia LLP is that a partner does not
assume personal liability for either partnership debts or the debts of
other partners. 24 As a result, with respect to the limited liability
issues applied to partnerships, an LLP may be preferred over a general
partnership and also over a limited partnership, since a limited
partnership requires at least one general partner to assume personal
liability.
In any event, since only about half of the states have adopted LLP
legislation, a Georgia LLP that does business out-of-state should first see
if the foreign jurisdiction has an LLP statute.32 5 If there is no LLP
statue enacted in that foreign jurisdiction, then there is some risk the
foreign jurisdiction will not recognize the added protection that LLP
status affords partners in Georgia.3 26
It is not difficult under the Georgia statutes for a general partnership
to elect to be an LLP. A general partnership must record a "limited
liability partnership election" in the office of the clerk of the superior
court of any county in which the partnership has an office. LLP status
is then conferred on the general partnership. 32 7 The clerk may collect
a fee in the amount of the fee then allowed for the filing of statements
of partnership.32 The election must state: (1) the name of the partnership; (2) the nature of its business; (3) that the partnership elects LLP

320. Id. at 707, 455 S.E.2d at 393.
321.

Id.

322. O.C.G.A. Title 14, Chapter 8 (1982).
323. See GEORGIA LLC/LLP HANDBOOK, supra note 248, at Part 2, Chapter 1
(discussing Georgia limited liability partnerships).
324. O.C.G.A. § 14-8-15(b) (Supp. 1995).
325.

GEORGIA LLC/LLP HANDBOOK, supra note 248, at 42.

326. Id.
327. O.C.G.A. § 14-8-62(a) (Supp. 1995).
328. Id.
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status; and (4) that the election has been duly authorized." 9 The
name of the LLP must include the words "limited liability partnership,"
or the abbreviation "L.L.P.," or the designation "LLP."3 ° Moreover,
the word 'limited" may be abbreviated as "ltd."' 1
Conforming changes were made throughout Chapter 8 of the O.C.G.A.
to conform with the addition of the LLP entity. Further, the 1995
amendments deleted the requirement that foreign limited liability
partnerships have capital accounts or carry liability insurance.33 2
(ii) Foreign Limited Partnerships--Activities not Constituting
Transacting Business. Two additional activities were added by the
1995 amendments which, if taken alone, would not rise to the level of
"transacting business." These are: (1) owning, without more, real or
personal property in Georgia; and (2) directly or indirectly owning or
controlling another entity organized under the laws of Georgia or
transacting business in Georgia.3 33
(iii) Limited Partnerships-Indemnification of Partners or
Other Persons; Expansion, Restriction, or Elimination of
Partners' Duties and Liabilities in Partnership Agreement. The
Georgia Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act was amended to
include a provision which allows partners in a limited partnership to
expand, restrict or eliminate the partners' liabilities and duties,
including fiduciary duties, in the partnership agreement.3 34 A partner's liability to the partnership and other partners cannot, however, be
limited in the case of intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of
the law or in any transaction for which the partner received a personal
benefit in violation of any provision of the partnership agreement. 33 5
The amendments also state that a partner in a limited partnership shall
have no liability to the partnership or other partners if he relied in good
faith on a provision of the partnership agreement, 6

329. Id. § 14-8-62(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. 1994).
330. Id. § 14-8-63 (Supp. 1995).

331. Id.
332. Id. § 14-8-44(a).
333. Id. § 14-9-902(b)(9), (13).
334. Id. § 14-9-108(b)(1).

335. Id.
336. Id. § 14-9-108(b)(2).
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SECURITIES

Stock in Closely-Held Corporationis "Security"for Purposesof

UCC's Statute of Fraudsfor Investment Securities; Oral Agreement By
Employer to Transfer CorporateStock to Employee Deemed not a
"Sale"for Statute of FraudsProvision
In Thompson v. Kohl,"'7 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the
stock of a closely-held corporation was a "security" within the meaning
of the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 8 on Investment Securities."'
Thus, the "sale" of closely-held stock is subject to Article 8s statute of
frauds provision. 39 The court also held, however, that an employer's
oral agreement to transfer corporate stock to an employee for nonmonetary consideration was not a "sale" for purposes of Article 8s
statute of frauds and, therefore, the agreement did not need to meet the
provision's requirements to be enforceable.34
The case stemmed from allegations by a fired employee that his
employer had verbally promised to transfer ten percent of the stock of
the employer's closely-held company as compensation due under the
terms of an otherwise written employment agreement.341 If the statute
of frauds provision applied, then the oral agreement would have been
unenforceable absent an exclusion. The court maintained that prior
Georgia cases had failed to consider the question of whether shares of
stock in a closely-held corporation were "securities" under Article 8."2

337. 216 Ga. App. 148, 453 S.E.2d 485 (1994).
338. Id. at 149, 453 S.E.2d at 487. Georgia's Uniform Commercial Code-Investment
Securities is codified at O.C.G.A. § 11-8-101 (1994).
339. The statute of frauds provision for Georgia's Uniform Commercial
Code-Investment Securities provides that a contract for the sale of securities is not
enforceable unless: (1) there is some signed writing signed by the party (or his authorized
agent or broker) against whom enforcement is sought sufficient to indicate that a contract
has been made for the sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a stated price; (2)
delivery of a certificated security or transfer instruction has been accepted, or transfer of
an uncertificated security has been registered and the transferee has failed to timely object,
or payment has been made; (3) within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the
sale or purchase has been received by the party against whom enforcement is sought and
the recipient does not object within 10 days after its receipt; or (4) the party against whom
enforcement is sought admits in his testimony, pleadings, or otherwise in court that a
contract was made for a stated quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price.
O.C.G.A. § 11-08-319 (1994). This provision only applies to "securities." Id.
340. 216 Ga. App. at 151, 453 S.E.2d at 488.
341. Id. at 148, 453 S.E.2d at 486.
342. Id. at 150, 453 S.E.2d at 487; but see Cohen v. William Goldberg & Co., infra note
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Citing the official comment to the UCC's definitional section in Article
8, the court easily decided that such stock was a "security."3" In fact,
the official comment states that shares of closely-held stock are intended
to be included within the definition. 3"
Thus, without more, the
statute of frauds would have applied to the oral agreement and the offer
of the securities would have been required to be in writing in order to be
enforceable.
The employee argued that Article 8's statute of frauds did not apply
to an oral contract under which an employer had agreed to transfer
corporate stock to an employee in consideration for services rendered
since the transaction was not a "sale" of securities.3" Because Article
8 does not define "sale," the court looked to Article 2 of the UCC,
Webster's Dictionary, and cases from other jurisdictions in holding that
the transfer was not a "sale."34 The court's decision turned on the fact
347
that the employee did not have to pay for the stock in currency.
Given that, in the court's view, the stock had no "price," and where there
was no "price" there could be no "sale" for purposes of the statute of
frauds. The court held that the necessary element to a finding of no
"sale" is "non-monetary consideration."3 48
The court recognized that the issue was debatable, but stated that 349
in any case, if it had found a "sale," the oral agreement would have been
removed from the statute of frauds because the employee had already
rendered the services that constituted the consideration for the transfer,
thus entitling the employee to seek enforcement under the terms of the
statute of frauds.35 °
The court's reasoning has tortured the established Georgia law in this
area and has overlooked and failed to cite Cohen v. William Goldberg &
Co.3"' That case, decided by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1992,
determined that stock in a closely-held corporation is a "security." As a
security such stock is subject to, among other things, the restrictions of
Article 8 of the Georgia Uniform Commercial Code. There are excellent

343. 216 Ga. App. at 149, 453 S.E.2d at 487.
(definitions).

See O.C.G.A. § 11-8-102(C) (1994)

344. 216 Ga. App. at 150, 453 S.E.2d at 487.
345. Id.
346. Id., 453 S.E.2d at 487-88.

347. Id. at 151, 453 S.E.2d at 488.
348. Id.
349. Id.

350. Id. See O.C.G.A. § 11-8-319(b) (applicable statute of frauds exclusion).
351. 262 Ga. 606, 423 S.E.2d 231 (1992) (the seminal Georgia case in the area, which

stands for proposition that if it is stock, even in a closely-held corporation, it is stock under
Federal securities laws and Georgia law).
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long-standing and compelling policy reasons for the "in writing"
requirements of the statute of frauds. These should not be abused
simply to reach a "fair" result, and the need for certainty as to whether
stock in a closely-held corporation is a "security" is likewise extremely
important to establish." 2
B.

Eleventh Circuit Accepts and Applies "Bespeaks Caution"Doctrine
In Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Associates, Ltd.,353 limited
partners brought a securities fraud action against their limited
partnership under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. The limited partners
alleged they were lured into the partnership by offering materials which
contained misstatements or omissions of material fact.'3 4 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia had previously
entered summary judgment in favor of the limited partnership, and the
partners subsequently appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's judgment. 5 5 In so
doing, the court accepted and applied the "bespeaks caution" doctrine.35 The doctrine generally holds:
When an offering document's forecasts, opinions or projections are
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements, the forward-looking
statements will not form the basis for a securities fraud claim if those
statements did not affect the "total mix" of information the document
provided investors. In other words, cautionary language, if sufficient,
renders the alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a
matter of law.3" 7

In the case at bar, the court found the limited partnership's private
placement memorandum contained sufficient cautionary language to
insulate the partnership from the fraud claim. 5 " The court commented that the caution was not "boilerplate and was not buried among too
many other things, but was explicit, repetitive and linked to the
projections about which plaintiffs complain[ed." 359

352. See Paul A. Quir6s &Lynn Scott Magruder, Business Associations, 44 MERCER L.
REV. 67, 95 (1992).
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

45 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 399-400.
Id. at 400.
Id.
In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993).
45 F.3d at 400.

359. Id.
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V. BANKS AND BANKING

A. Attorneys Need Express Actual Authority To Endorse and Deposit
Drafts Made Payable To Clients
In Tifton Bank & Trust Co. v. Knight's Furniture Co., 60 the Georgia
Court of Appeals held that where an attorney does not have the express
actual authority to endorse and deposit into his account a draft made
payable to a client, but does so anyway, the attorney has committed a
forgery and the accepting bank is liable for conversion. 6 1 In reaching
its decision, the court placed particular emphasis on the fact that the
attorney's client had expressly forbidden him to endorse any draft on its
behalf.
To be sure, Tifton Bank overrules the court's earlier decision in Titus
v. Commercial Bank, Douglasville,162 which held that an attorney had
the implied authority to endorse and deposit a check made payable to his
client, despite the fact the client had expressly denied the attorney the
authority to do so.363 Further, the court rejected the bank's reliance
on the 1939 case of John Bean Mfg. Co. v. Citizens Bank of Gainesville, 364 which held that an attorney employed to collect an account had
implied authority to endorse his client's name to a draft to convert it365
to
cash where the parties had not discussed the attorney's authority.
The court also noted that John Bean Mfg. could no longer be relied on
as authority for the proposition that a bank can escape liability when it
pays a 66check on an attorney's unauthorized endorsement of his client's
name.

3

The court said that such a proposition is inconsistent with and
superseded by applicable Uniform Commercial Code provisions. Under
O.C.G.A. sections 11-3-419(1)(c) and 16-9-2(a), banks are generally liable
for accepting deposit drafts endorsed without the authority of the
payee.367 The court commented that "[t]he legislature could have but
did not carve out an exception for attorneys."36 The court also pointed
out that John Bean Mfg. is inconsistent with state rules on professional

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

215 Ga. App. 471, 452 S.E.2d 219 (1994).
Id. at 471, 452 S.E.2d at 221.
214 Ga. App. 657, 448 SE.2d 753 (1994).
215 Ga. App. at 472, 452 S.E.2d at 221.
60 Ga. App. 615, 4 S.E.2d 924 (1939).
215 Ga. App. at 471, 452 S.E.2d at 221.
Id.
Id. at 472, 452 S.E.2d at 221.
Id.
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conduct.369 In the Matter of Antinoro370 and in the Matter of Frederick M. Scherma3 71 the Georgia Supreme Court stated that it was a
violation of State Bar Rule 4-102, Standard 4, for an attorney to endorse
a draft on a client's behalf without permission, 7 2
Presiding Judge Beasley concurred specially and Judges Pope and
Blackburn joined.373 Judge Beasley expressed concern that the court's
holding would necessarily make attorneys special agents of their
clients. 4 This, the Judge noted, wrongfully places severe limits on
the doctrine of implied authority, thus requiring banks to make sure an
attorney is authorized to endorse a client's name, perhaps by requiring
production of a power of attorney, which expressly provides for such
authority, in order to protect themselves from liability.3 75
Judge Beasley explained:
No longer does [the implied authority of an attorney to endorse the
name of his client on a draft] arise out of the statutory provision that
"[t]he agent's authority shall be construed to include all necessary and
usual means for effectually executing it .... Private instructions or
limitations not known to persons dealing with a general agent shall not
affect them. In special agencies for a particular purpose, persons
dealing with the agent should examine his authority .... " In this case
there is a limitation, placed by the client .... Thus, what was once
not a forgery because the law implied authority where there was no
express authorization and no refusal to authorize, now is regarded as
a forgery if it is undertaken without express authority.37

B.

Silent Confirmation is Not Article Five Confirmation
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in Dibrell Brothers
International S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro 77 that a silent
confirmation of a letter of credit is not a UCC Article 5 confirmation, but
if the evidence of the existence of a contract is sufficient, recovery may
be had on
a claim for common law breach of contract to silently
378
confirm.

369. Id. at 473, 452 S.E.2d at 222.
370.
371.

253 Ga. 296, 319 S.E.2d 460 (1984).
255 Ga. 206, 336 S.E.2d 570 (1985).

372. 215 Ga. App. at 473, 452 S.E.2d at 222.
373. Id. at 476, 452 S.E.2d at 224.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 476-77, 452 S.E.2d at 224.
376. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 10-6-50 (1993)).
377. 38 F.3d 1571 (l1th Cir. 1994).
378. Id. at 1581. This case provides an excellent overview on letters of credit
transactions, which is beyond the scope of this Article.
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The court explained that when a silent confirmation is part of a letter
of credit transaction, "the seller acts as both the 'customer,' requesting
the confirmation, and the beneficiary, receiving the assurance of
confirmation."3 79 But here, the court noted, the "customer" does not
ask for confirmation of its engagement like an issuing bank would do in
an Article 5 confirmation, but rather the "customer" is asking for the
engagement of another.8 ° Due to the reconfiguration of relationships
between an issuing bank and a confirming bank in a silent confirmation,
the confirming bank is not afforded the rights and duties provided by
Article 5.81 Thus, "[a] silent confirmer may owe a contractual duty to
the beneficiary who sought the engagement, but no statutory duty is
owed to the issuing bank under O.C.G.A sections 11-5-107 and 11-5-109.
Also, the silent confirmer has no statutory right of reimbursement from
the issuer."8 2
C. New State Banking Rules Adopted
Although slightly outside the survey period, there were important
revisions to the state's banking laws that relate to matters during the
survey period. On September 25, 1995, just four days before the first
part of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
of 1994 ("Riegle-Nealr) 3 3 became effective, Georgia's Department of
Banking and Finance (the "Department") adopted new state banking
rules. As of September 29, 1995, Riegle-Neal permits bank holding
companies to acquire Georgia banks subject to Georgia's five-year age
requirement.3 The second part of Riegle-Neal becomes effective June
1, 1997. 33 It allows interstate bank mergers, unless the state "opts
out.". The Department has announced that it intends to propose an
"opt-in" bill, which would allow Georgia banks to begin participating in
interstate mergers early.38 7 The proposal would not permit de novo
branching. Instead, Georgia would opt-in by acquisition only."
On July 14, 1995, the Department proposed new unaffiliated agency
provisions which would have allowed banks to establish certain agency

379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. at 1580.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1580-81.
Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994).
Id.

385. Id.
386. Id.
387. September 28, 1995 letter to all interested persons from E.D. Dunn, Georgia
Banking Commissioner, regarding the status of regulations issued July 14, 1995.

388. Id.
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relationships or alliances with other banks to provide services. Due to
a large number of negative comments on one section of the new
rule-the provision for Georgia banks to act as principal or agent with
unaffiliated Georgia banks-the rule was not adopted, but was amended
and restated and is awaiting comment before adoption. 89
The Department noted that opportunities for unaffiliated banks to
form alliances to serve a more mobile customer base would benefit
smaller community banks."g Upon consideration of the comments
received from the first proposal, the Department revised its proposed
regulations on the rule to eliminate the mention of unaffiliated banks for
direct bank services, and kept them only for the realm of "shared" ATMs,
which require agency contracts.39' The Department advised banks
wishing to establish agency relationships before the reissued rules are
adopted to contact the Department for guidance. 92
The Department adopted new Rule 80-6-1-.14, under which the
Commissioner has the authority to exempt a transaction by a Georgia
bank holding company which constitutes an internal corporate restructuring from treatment as an acquisition of control within the meaning
of Georgia Code section 7-1-608. 893 The Department believed that
given a dynamic banking environment, banks should be able to
internally reorganize through their holding companies without violating
the law prohibiting bank holding companies from acquiring control of
other banks.'9 Nonetheless, in order to assure that a bank holding
company does not indirectly obtain banking locations in a new county,
the General Statement of Policy accompanying the Rule provides that a
corporate restructure may not create separate subsidiaries within a
single county, as that would enable a bank to relocate one subsidiary in
a new county and leave behind the other in the old county.'
Rule 80-6-1-.15 was adopted by the Department to further clarify
Georgia's intrastate branching restrictions. Under O.C.G.A. section 7-1608 a bank or its predecessor must have been continuously conducting
a banking business for five years prior to its being acquired by a bank
holding company. Rule 80-6-1-. 15 permits the revival of prior unit-bank

389.

Id. See Proposed Banking Rule 80-1-2-.01.

390.

FINAL BANKING REGULATIONS, SYNOPSIS AND PURPOSE: REISSUANCE, Chapter 80-

1-2, Agency Relationships of FinancialInstitutions (Sept. 27, 1995).
391.

Id.

392. Id. at section entitled "Interim Policy."
393.

GA. Comp. R. REGS. r. 80-6-1-.14 (1995).

394. FINAL BANKING REGULATIONS, Department Response to Comments for Rule 80-6-1.14 (Sept. 27, 1995).
395. FINAL BANKING REGULATIONS, General Statement of Policy for 80-6-1-.14 (Sept.
27, 1995).
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charters of bank holding companies which were previously merged into
another bank subsidiary. Under the rule, a revived charter is deemed
to meet the five-year history requirement, effectively regaining its
separate pre-merger identity and age. Thus, multi-county bank holding
companies can "unscramble the egg" of a prior merger by splitting-off an
acquired unit-bank charter and its associated assets. The separate
charter could then be sold to another bank holding company without
violating the five-year age requirement, provided that all of the banking
assets associated with the charter are sold.
Rule 80-1-15-.01 was also amended to require that when a group of
banks is "sharing" an ATM, only a bank or banks qualified to do a
banking business in that location may actually establish, own or rent
that ATM.396 The other banks can share the ATM, but cannot be a
participant in these primary functions with respect to it. The Department's policy statement for this regulation makes it clear that transaction fees are not considered rent for these purposes. 97 A bank establishing an ATM must also give prior notice by letter to the Department
in accordance with Rule 80-1-1-.06. 398 Moreover, agency considerations
must be addressed where a bank "shares" an ATM.3
Amendments to Rule 80-1-15-.03 on courier services were adopted as
well. Third-party courier services must be independent of the bank and
must satisfy the conditions contained in Rule 80-1-15-.03."' Additionally, the courier service should be generally available to the public.4"'
The regulations note that it is not a violation of the rule for a bank to
advertise to its customers that a third-party courier service is available
to them for their bank transactions.4 " The name of the courier service
must, however, be clearly distinguishable from the name of the
bank.4 '
A number of other provisions were amended or adopted, but the
aforementioned provisions received the most comments from the banking
industry.

396. FINAL BANKING REGULATIONS, General Statement of Policy for 80-1-15-.01 (Sept.
27, 1995).
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399.
400.
401.
402.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
FINAL BANKING REGULATIONS, General Statement of Policy for 80-1-15-.03 (1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.

